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Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran: Iran Granted
Immunity Under the Noncommercial Tort
Exception of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976
In Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran' the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided whether foreign
states may claim sovereign immunity in suits by American citizens
injured by the states' tortious acts occurring at United States embas-
sies. The Persinger court held in favor of immunity and clarified ambi-
guities in the language of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 (FSIA).2 It decided that a United States embassy is not "in the
United States" within the meaning of the FSIA,3 and that both the
tortious act or omission and the injury must occur within the United
States for a foreign state to be subject to jurisdiction under the non-
commercial exception to immunity in the FSIA. 4 The decision offers
an important judicial interpretation of sections of the FSIA, the
meanings of which had been left unclear by earlier cases.
On November 4, 1979 Iranian militants seized the United States
embassy in Tehran, Iran. The embassy's personnel, including Greg-
ory Alan Persinger, a United States Marine, were held hostage in vio-
lation of international law for over fourteen months. Iran freed the
hostages on January 20, 1981 pursuant to an executive agreement
obligating the United States to terminate all legal proceedings, nul-
lify all judgments in American courts involving Iran, and settle all
such claims by arbitration. 5 Sergeant Persinger and his parents
brought suit in the district court of the District of Columbia against
Iran for injuries suffered during Persinger's captivity. The court
granted the United States motion to dismiss based on President
Carter's executive order implementing the terms of the agreement
1 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984).
2 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2), (3), 1391(f, 1441(d), 1601-1611 (1982).
3 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 839.
4 Id. at 842.
5 The terms of the agreement are embodied in two documents, The Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and The Declaration
of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. See American International Group, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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and held that, in the alternative, Iran would be immune from suit
under the FSIA.6
The Court of Appeals originally affirmed the district court's dis-
missal but held that the sovereign immunity defense did not apply.7
On rehearing, the court reversed itself on the immunity question,
noting that it was without authority to decide whether the executive
order extinguished Persinger's claims.8
The Persinger court granted Iran immunity based on its interpre-
tation of the FSIA's section 1605(a)(5),9 read in light of the defini-
tion provided in section 1603(c).10 It reasoned that Congress, in
drafting section 1603(c), had included the words "continental or in-
sular" to modify the phrase "all territory and waters . . . subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States" in an attempt to restrict the
Act's application to the continental United States and its islands."
Such a definition would exclude United States military bases, embas-
6 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 837. Relying on Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981), the district court held that "the President may dispose of private claims against
foreign states to resolve, or avoid, international crises." Persinger v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, No. 81-00230, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 1981).
7 See Persinger, 729 F.2d at 837.
8 Id. at 838. The court, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), reasoned it would be exercis-
ing authority "illegitimately" if it decided the merits of the case before addressing the
jurisdictional issue. Id. at n.4. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). For discussions of the relationship be-
tween personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, and availability of sovereign im-
munity as a defense in a suit against a foreign state, see Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982). See generally Kane, Suing Foreign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 402-04 (1982).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) & (5) (1982) provides that:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money dam-
ages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or dam-
age to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this paragraph shall not apply to-
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion
be abused, or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel,
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.
Id.
10 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1982) provides that "for purposes of this chapter . . . the
'United States' includes all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the juris-
diction of the United States." Id.
1 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 839.
sies, and other possessions located in foreign territory. 12 The court
concluded, therefore, that Iran's tortious conduct did not occur "in
the United States" and was not excepted from immunity by section
1605(a)(5). 13 The court further reasoned that its interpretation was
supported by the legislative history of the FSIA and would bring the
United States into conformity with other nations and international
organizations.' 4 It also noted the possible "unhappy consequences"
that might result from a different interpretation of the statute as evi-
dence that Congress intended a restrictive application of the Act.' 5
Addressing the parents' claims, the court held that both the tor-
tious act and injury must occur in the United States for section
1605(a)(5) to apply.' 6 Noting a passage in the legislative history ex-
plicitly stating that "the tortious act or omission must occur within
the jurisdiction of the United States," the court reasoned it would be
anomalous to find that Congress intended to deny jurisdiction where
a hostage dies in Tehran and yet allow it where one dies after re-
turning to the United States.' 7 Furthermore, the court contrasted
the language of section 1605(a)(2), which provides for suit against a
foreign sovereign for its tortious commercial activities having a "di-
rect effect" in the United States, with that of section 1605(a)(5) and
concluded that Congress used different language to effect a different
meaning.18 The dissent believed the "plain language" of the statute
clearly requires that only the injury occur in the United States and
saw no reason to rely on the legislative history for a different
interpretation. 19
A look at the history of sovereign immunity in the United States
is helpful to explain the significance of Persinger. The United States
first recognized the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the early nine-
teenth century in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Fadden.20 Chief Justice
Marshall found that a foreign state's plea of immunity was consistent
with the general law and practice of nations. 2' Gradually, however,
courts began to place less emphasis on general principles of interna-
tional law in favor of following the policies of the State Depart-
ment.22 In 1952 these policies were enunciated in a letter from
12 Id. at 839, 841.
13 Id. at 842.
'4 Id. at 839-40. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6610 [hereinafter cited as "HousE REPORT"].
15 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 841.
16 Id. at 843.
17 Id. at 842-43 (citing HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6619).
18 Id. at 843.
19 Id. at 844.
20 il U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
21 Id. at 136.
22 E.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945); Exparte Peru, 318 U.S. 578,
587-89 (1943); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 670 (D.D.C. 1980).
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Legal Advisor Jack Tate. 23 The letter suggested use of a restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity that provided for immunity only when
the acts of a foreign state were of a public or sovereign nature rather
than simply private or commercial. 24 This restrictive theory replaced
the absolute theory of immunity, which had required a sovereign's
consent to assert jurisdiction on any issue. 25
The distinction between a state's public actions and its private
or commercial ones was often difficult to make and was frequently
influenced by diplomatic as well as legal considerations. 26 To reduce
the foreign policy implications of sovereign immunity decisions and
to assure that such findings were made on a strictly legal basis, Con-
gress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.27 The
Act specifies the instances in which a party may take legal action
against a foreign state, the circumstances under which a foreign state
is entitled to immunity, and the available remedies if a state fails to
pay a judgment against it. The FSIA sets forth the requirements for
personal jurisdiction over a foreign state and grants the district
courts original jurisdiction of civil actions against a state not entitled
to immunity. 28
Section 1604 of the Act grants foreign states immunity from the
jurisdiction of United States courts subject to the exceptions in sec-
tions 1605-1607.29 Section 1605(a)(5) provides that a foreign state
is not immune from suits for money damages arising out of the tor-
tious conduct causing "personal injury or death or damage to or loss
of property, occurring in the United States."'30 Section 1603(c) de-
fines "United States" as "all territory and waters, continental or in-
sular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 3'
Because the specific issues raised in Persinger rarely have been
litigated, it is useful to examine decisions on similar issues under the
23 Letter from State Department Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to Acting Attor-
ney General Phillip B. Perlman (May 11, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 984
(1952).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 670. For discussions of the principle of sovereign immu-
nity prior to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, see generally Victory Transport, Inc.
v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965);
Note, Sovereign Immunity in the Supreme Court: Using the Certiorari Process to Avoid Decision-
Making, 16 VA. J. Irr'L L. 903, 904-09, 920-24 (1976).
27 FSIA, supra note 2. For an excellent discussion of the FSIA, see von Mehren, The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978).
28 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1604 provides:
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of the enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States ex-
cept as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.
Id.
30 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
si See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).3 2 The FTCA waives sovereign im-
munity previously enjoyed by the United States and its employees
with respect to certain tort claims that give rise to private liability.3 3
Congress apparently chose to pattern the FSIA after the FTCA.34
Section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA, providing for liability of foreign gov-
ernments for their noncommercial torts, closely parallels the FTCA
section providing for consent to suit by the United States for the
same acts.3 5 Both statutes preserve immunity with respect to the
same torts, such as malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and li-
bel.36 These parallels indicate the FTCA may serve as a guide for
interpreting the FSIA.
Cases involving sections 1346(b) and 2680(k) of the FTCA fur-
ther shed light on whether the exercise ofjurisdiction over a foreign
state under section 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA requires that the tortious
conduct as well as the injury occur in the United States. Section
1346(b) grants district courts original jurisdiction of claims against
the United States for injuries to persons or property,3 7 but its appli-
cability is limited by section 2680(k) to claims "arising in a foreign
country."3 8 For example, in Richards v. United States3 9 the Supreme
Court held that government liability for negligence under section
1346(b) should be determined by the law of the place where the neg-
ligent act occurred and not where the act had its "operative effect." 40
Similarly, the court in Roberts v. United States4 1 determined that, under
section 2680(k), a tort claim arises where the negligent act or omis-
sion occurs. 42 In Manemann v. United States43 the court held that
32 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291,
1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1982)).
33 Id.
34 See Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Sovereign Immunity:
Part Ill, 85 CoM. L.J. 298 (1980).
35 See id. at 299.
36 See id.
37 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 of this title, the district courts, to-
gether with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, ac-
cruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal
injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
Id.
38 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) provides that "the provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to . . . any claim arising in a foreign country." Id.
39 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
40 Id. at 10.
41 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
42 Id. at 522 & n.2.
43 381 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1967).
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where negligent acts in Taiwan resulted in injury in the United
States, the claim arose in a foreign country for the purpose of section
2680(k).44
Courts interpreting the FSIA have reached differing conclu-
sions. In In re Sedco, Inc.4 5 the court held that the tortious act "in
whole" must occur in the United States for section 1605(a)(5) to ap-
ply.46 The decision turned on a sentence included in the House Ju-
diciary Committee's Report on the FSIA, explicitly stating that "the
tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the
United States."14 7 As further evidence of the limited applicability of
section 1605(a)(5), the Sedco court noted that the House Report
states that the primary purpose of this exception is to cover the prob-
lem of traffic accidents of foreign embassy and governmental officials
in the United States. 48
In Harris v. Vao Intourist, Moscow4 9 the court noted that the legis-
lative history indicates that section 1330(b) of the FSIA,50 the federal
long-arm statute extending jurisdiction over foreign states, is pat-
terned after the District of Columbia's long-arm statute. 5' The Har-
ris court found that causing injury to American citizens abroad was
an insufficient nexus by itself to justify the exercise of jurisdiction
under the District of Columbia statute.
52
The court in Letelier v. Republic of Chile53 allowed suit under sec-
tion 1605(a)(5) even though the alleged acts by the defendant state
to assassinate a United States citizen occurred in Chile. The court
said that to hold otherwise "would totally emasculate the purpose
and effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by per-
mitting a foreign state to reimpose the so recently supplanted frame-
work of sovereign immunity as defined prior to the Act 'through the
back door, under the guise of the act of state doctrine.'
54
44 Id. at 705. See also In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D.
Cal. 1975). In that case, the court found plaintiff's claim, based on injuries suffered in an
airplane crash in France caused by alleged governmental negligence in California, did not
arise in a foreign country.
45 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
46 Id. at 567.
47 HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 6619.
48 Sedco, 543 F. Supp. at 567.
49 481 F. Supp. 1056 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
50 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b) provides:
Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief
over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where
service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
Id.
51 See Harris, 481 F. Supp. at 1061. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 13, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6612; Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F.
Supp. 264, 266 (D.D.C. 1978).
52 Harris, 481 F. Supp. at 1062.
53 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
54 Id. at 674 (quoting Amicus Brief of United States at 41, Alfred Dunhill of London,
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Court decisions interpreting the FTCA are also useful to clarify
the meaning of section 1603(c) of the FSIA. By its terms, the FTCA
does not apply to any claim "arising in a foreign country."' 55 In Kuhn
v. United States56 the court denied jurisdiction over plaintiffs claim
that he was injured while on the Marshall Islands by exposure to ra-
diation from nuclear testing by the United States. The court said the
Marshall Islands is a "foreign country" even though the United
States exercises significant authority over the islands, according to a
trust agreement with the United Nations. 57
In Meredith v. United States58 the court rejected plaintiff's conten-
tion that her claim did not "arise in a foreign country" because the
wrongful acts occurred at the American embassy in Thailand. 59 The
court said Congress intended liability under the FTCA to be deter-
mined by the law of the state where the tortious act occurred. 60
Therefore, Congress excluded from the FTCA claims arising abroad
to prevent the United States from being subject to the laws of other
nations that have claims arising in the United States. 61 The court
concluded that a United States embassy must be regarded as "in a
foreign country" to accord with congressional intent. The Meredith
court noted other reasons for excluding claims arising in foreign
countries: "absence of United States courts in such countries, diffi-
culty of bringing defense witnesses from the scene of the alleged
torts, and reluctance to extend the FTCA's benefits to foreign
populations." 6 2
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)). The act of state doctrine was established
in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897), in which the Supreme Court held:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. Courts differ as to whether the FSIA applies to acts of a foreign state of public or
sovereign nature as well as to those that are simply private or commercial. Relying on
Dunhill, the court in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D.
Ill. 1983), said "there could be no doubt" that the act of state doctrine survived the enact-
ment of the FSIA. Id. at 364. The Letelier court, however, found that the FSIA redefined
"public acts" as those "not within the exceptions in sections 1605-1607," thereby overrid-
ing the act of state doctrine. 488 F. Supp. at 672 (quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at
17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6616). The court held that the gener-
ality of the terms of the FSIA indicates it should apply to all tort claims for money
damages.
55 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
56 541 F. Supp. 567 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
57 Id. at 568. See also Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1958).
58 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964).
59 Id. at 11. In Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951), the court held
that the phrase "in a foreign country" should be used in section 2680(k) of the FTCA with
the meaning dictated by "common sense" and "common speech." Id. at 612.
60 Meredith, 330 F.2d at 10. See also United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
61 Meredith, 330 F.2d at 10.
62 Id. at 10-11 (quoting Burma v. United States, 240 F.2d 720, 722 (4th Cir. 1957)).
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In United States v. Archer6 3 a foreign defendant was charged with
having falsified an application for a nonimmigrant visa at the United
States embassy in Mexico. In conflict with the Meredith reasoning,
the court asserted jurisdiction, holding that a consulate or embassy is
part of United States territory.6 4 The court found that a consul be-
comes a magistrate insofar as the United States has authority to con-
fer on him the power to administer an oath. 65 Similarly, in Agee v.
Muskee66 the court stated that "[t]he ground occupied by a United
States embassy is not officially United States territory, but such
premises are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the United
States criminal laws and to the extent indicated by our laws and
decisions." 6 7
In McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran68 twelve former hostages and
two of their wives sued Iran for injuries resulting from the fourteen-
month captivity. The Ninth Circuit held that section 1603(c) refers
only to areas subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States and thus does not include foreign embassies. 6 9 The McKeel
court concluded that a liberal reading of section 1603(c) would in-
clude United States embassies within the section 1605(a)(5) excep-
tion but believed that congressional intent was to the contrary. The
court noted that the legislative history showed that section
1605(a)(5) was directed primarily at the problem of traffic accidents
in the United States caused by cars operated by foreign embassy offi-
cials and, therefore, was meant to serve only a limited purpose.
70
The McKeel court also believed that the "principle of national-
ity" and the "protective principle" allow the United States to assert
jurisdiction over individuals who commit torts at embassies abroad
but not over those states in which the embassies are located. The
principle of nationality provides that a state may punish its citizens
for wrongful conduct no matter where the conduct takes place. The
protective principle maintains that certain crimes against the sover-
eignty of a state may be punished regardless of the nationality of the
actor or the location of the act.7 1 The McKeel court observed that
jurisdiction over the forum state itself could hurt United States rela-
63 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
64 Id. at 709. See also United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968). In that case, the Second Circuit held that Congress had the authority to
give federal courts jurisdiction over a visa applicant who perjured herself at the American
Consulate in Canada.
65 Archer, 51 F. Supp. at 709.
66 629 F.2d 80 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67 Id. at 111. See also G. Hackworth, IV INTERNATIONAL LAw 564 (1942).
68 722 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1983).
69 Id. at 589. The court noted that territory is a primary basis for jurisdiction, and
United States embassies remain part of the territory of the receiving state. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 77 (1965).
70 McKeel, 722 F.2d at 587.
71 Id. at 588.
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tions with other governments and, under the principle of reciproc-
ity, 7 2 could make the United States subject to foreign jurisdiction for
the actions of its employees at foreign embassies in the United
States. 73
The Persinger ruling that the tortious act must occur in the
United States for an immunity exception to apply is consistent with
most cases that have dealt with the issue. The court rejected a literal
reading of the FSIA in favor of an interpretation which, in its opin-
ion, reflects the true intention of Congress. 74 As in Sedco, the
Persinger court relied heavily on the passage in the House Report,
which states that the tortious act must occur within the jurisdiction of
the United States. 75 Although the dissent found no reason to favor
the report's language over the "plain language of the statute," the
majority chose to follow the admonition of the Supreme Court in
United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc. 76 to construe the lan-
guage so as to give effect to the intent of Congress. 77 The Persinger
court noted that Congress intended the FSIA to conform to the pre-
vailing practice in international law.78 The general rule is that a state
loses its sovereign immunity only when its tortious acts occur within
the territory of the forum state. 79
Other bases for the Persinger holding as to section 1605(a)(5) are
not as sound. Although Congress may have intended different
meanings by wording sections 1605(a)(2) and 1605(a)(5) differently,
the dissent rightly suggests that Congress could just as easily have
intended to restrict jurisdiction more in cases involving commercial
torts than in cases involving noncommercial ones.80 The dissent also
correctly contends that Congress could have chosen to restrict juris-
72 See M. WHITEMAN, 6 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 580-82 (1968). The author
notes that the Polish Supreme Court, applying the principle of reciprocity, refused to as-
sert jurisdiction over the Republic of France in a 1958 suit arising from an accident in
Poland that involved a car owned by the French Consulate. The Court stated:
The jurisdictional immunity of foreign states is based on principles univer-
sally accepted in international intercourse, among which the most essential
one is the principle of reciprocity between states, springing from the funda-
mental principle of their equality. The principle of reciprocity consists in the
recognizing or denying of jurisdictional immunity by one state with respect
to another state to the same extent as the latter recognizes or denies immu-
nity in relation to other states.
Id.
73 McKeel, 722 F.2d at 589.
74 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 843-44.
75 See HousE REPORT, supra note 14, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6619.
76 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
77 Id. at 542. The court added that "when aid to the construction of the meaning of
words as used in the statute is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which for-
bids its use, however clear the words appear on superficial examination." Id. at 543-44.
78 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 840. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
79 722 F.2d at 588. See, e.g., European Convention on State Immunity, Arts. 7, 11,
Council of Europe, No. 74 (1972).
80 Persinger, 729 F.2d at 844. (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.)
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diction over claims prompted by acts outside the United States "as a
policy matter," despite any anomalous results it might create. 8'
The decision in Persinger nevertheless helps clarify the meaning
of section 1603(c). Although the court's conclusion that the words
"continental or insular" modify "all territory and waters . . . subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States" lacks supporting legislative
history or case law, it is logical. As in McKeel, the court referred to
the House Report's statement that section 1605(a)(5) was directed
primarily at the problem of traffic accidents as evidence that Con-
gress was primarily concerned with torts committed in the United
States.82
The Persinger court's most persuasive reasons for refusing to ex-
ercise jurisdiction are the "unhappy consequences" that might re-
sult. Eliminating immunity for torts committed in United States
embassies would virtually make those embassies United States terri-
tory for jurisdictional purposes. 83 That designation could make for-
eign states reluctant to provide services to those embassies because
they might be subject to suit in United States courts for negligent
acts. 84 Furthermore, such a result could make the United States vul-
nerable to suits abroad for torts committed on the premises of em-
bassies located in the United States.8 5 The Persinger court observed
that United States military and naval bases around the world could
be similarly affected. 86
Expansion of jurisdiction would also likely increase the amount
of litigation between Americans and foreign states at great cost and
inconvenience to the litigants and the courts, and would damage for-
eign relations. On the other side of the scale, the benefits of ex-
panded jurisdiction include assurance to United States citizens of a
forum for litigating claims against foreign states and the United
States Government's ability to hinder the actions of nations of which
it disapproves.
The Persinger court's reluctance to interpret the FSIA to deny
immunity likely stems from traditional notions that liability of for-
eign states is, in some instances, a political and not a judicial ques-
tion. That idea is embodied in the act of state doctrine, 87 which
requires courts to defer to legislative and executive branches when
the latter can best resolve a politically sensitive issue.88 The act of
81 Id.
82 Id. at 840.
83 Id. at 841.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
88 See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358
(9th Cir. 1981). See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-25
(1964).
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state doctrine, unlike the FSIA, is not jurisdictional and applies only
to questions concerning the legality of governmental or public acts 89
of a foreign sovereign, and not to private or commercial ones. 90
Nevertheless, the Persinger court appears to have proceeded with the
primary objective of the doctrine in mind-avoidance of ill-timed ju-
dicial decisions on the validity of acts of foreign sovereigns that
could embarrass the United States and disrupt its international di-
plomacy. 9 1 Judicial interference could often render ineffective legis-
lative and executive use of protocol, economic sanction, delay, and
other means of persuasion to resolve disputes with foreign states. 92
The Persinger opinion carefully balances the interests of the
United States and its citizens in having their rights protected by
United States courts against the interests of protecting the indepen-
dence and sovereignty of foreign states and preserving diplomatic
relations with them. Persinger emphasizes that while the United
States and its citizens may have claims against private foreign parties
for acts committed within that country, and against foreign states for
acts committed in the United States, United States citizens may not
sue foreign states for noncommercial torts committed within the
boundaries of those states. Unlike the court in Letelier, which refused
to allow the act of state doctrine to emasculate the FSIA, Persinger
wisely interprets the FSIA in a cautious manner, and restricts its ap-
plication in instances that are more appropriately dealt with by ad-
ministrative or diplomatic means or by special legislation.
-ScoTT HARTWELL SMITH
89 Courts have had difficulty determining what acts are "acts of state" and govern-
mental in nature for purposes of the act of state doctrine. Furthermore, it is not clear
whether the holding of hostages in Persinger should be regarded as an "act of state" by
Iran. For decisions on whether particular acts are such "acts of state," see Annot., 12
A.L.R. FED. 707, 741-50 (1972). Courts have applied the doctrine even though a foreign
state's act violated its own laws or took place before that government received de jure
recognition from the United States. Note, The Castro Government in American Courts: Sover-
eign Immunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1607, 1609 (1962).
90 See Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1359. For an excellent discussion of the relationship
between the FSIA and the act of state doctrine, see Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits
Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Political Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983).
91 See Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1358-59.
92 See id. at 1358.
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